Wealth Effects on Consumption across the Wealth Distribution: Empirical Evidence

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Motivations

- □ A policy issue for Central Banks: monetary policy transmission to consumer spending (through changes in asset values).
 □ Distributive effects of monetary policy across the population: QE and asset prices.
 □ And an old issue in the literature (Brumberg and Modigliani, 1954; Ando and Modigliani, 1963)
 □ Widely studied in the empirical literature (macro-based)
- France: **0.8 to 1 cent on annual consumption for every 1 euro increase** (Slacalek 2009, Chauvin and Damette, 2010)

estimates)

 for the U.S or the U.K: MPC out of wealth between 3 cents and 5 cents

Motivations

☐ Heterogeneity in households' consumption behaviours:

Total consumption may actually be made up of the aggregation of different consumption behaviors across population due to differences in wealth, age, portfolio composition, income expectations, etc.

☐ Theoretical background :

- Carroll and Kimball (1996): decreasing MPC due to uncertainty over wealth and income;
- King (1994) credit constraints induce a higher MPC
- Growing empirical literature accounting for household level heterogeneity (e.g. Parker (1999), Attanasio et al. (2009), Bover (2005) Browning et al., (2013), Campbell and Cocco (2007), Christelis et al. (2015), Disney et al. (2010), Jappelli and Pistaferri))

What do we do?

- ☐ Estimation of the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth (MPC) using the French Wealth survey (FWS 2010): cross-sectional differences in consumption behaviors and wealth
- First paper that estimates quantitative wealth effects on consumption for France using household level information (cross section)- Bover (2005): Spain, Paiella (2007): Italy
- ☐ Non durable consumption at the household level: imputed using FWS and the Household Budget Survey (Browning et al., 2003)
- ☐Main focus
- i) MPC heterogeneity across the wealth distribution and depending on the wealth composition
- i) Role of indebtedness

Contribution to the related literature

■MPC heterogeneity across the whole wealth distribution

- Mian et al. (2013): geographical price variations across the U.S.
- Some previous evidences of decreasing MPC based on household survey.
 Parker (1999), Bover (2005), Arrondel et al. (2014)

□Accounting for heterogeneity in net wealth composition

- Most of micro-based studies are mainly about heterogeneity of MPC out of housing wealth across age or homeownership status [Attanasio et al. (2009), Browning et al., (2013), Campbell and Cocco (2007), Disney et al. (2010), Clancy et al. (2014)]
- O Some estimates based on household wealth survey [Parker (1999), Bover (2005), Bostic et al.(2009), Grant and Peltonen (2008), Paiella (2007), Sierminska and Takhtamanova (2012), Christelis et al. (2015)]

☐ From micro heterogeneity to macro implications

- Micro based estimates of MPC out of wealth for various net wealth groups
- Consumption elasticities to wealth of each net wealth group: heterogeneous MPC + wealth and consumption distributions (mean values for each group) [Cf. Christelis et al. (2015)]

Main results

☐ Confirm the **limited wealth effects** on consumption in France (housing and financial wealth)

☐ Decreasing MPC across the net wealth distribution

Net wealth distribution		
p1-p50	1.4	12.2
P90+	0.8	n.s.

☐.... But increasing consumption elasticity to housing wealth [wealth concentration]

□ Role of indebtedness

- Heterogeneity depending on the debt pressure
- Role of mortgages in France? significant higher MPC out of housing wealth for households with mortgages: likely to reflect a selection effect in the bank lending policy.

Outline of the presentation

1. Introduction

2. Data

- Data sources
- Consumption measure
- Consumption and wealth distributions
- Econometric sample
- 3. Estimation results of the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth
- Baseline results
- Heterogeneity across the wealth distribution
- 4. Investigation of the collateral channel and other robustness tests

2. Data sources

☐ French Wealth Survey

- Part of the HFCS (first wave), conducted by INSEE
- 2009/2010 wave : october 2009-february 2010
- Cross-section of 15,006 households
- Oversampling of the wealthy
- National questionnaire (long experience: first French wealth survey: 1986, then conducted every 6 years, now every 3 years)
- New questions about consumption in this wave [not available before]: food consumption at home, outside home and utilities + qualitative indicators about other expenditures (clothing, public transport, cultural and recreational goods and services, health, children education, etc.)

☐ Household budget survey

- 2010 wave Fieldwork: oct2010-oct2011. About 15,000 households
- Used to impute consumption in the FWS


2. Measuring consumption at the household level

- Browning et al. (2003) approach to impute non durable consumption
- Consumption module of the FWS and the Household Budget Survey (Insee - Eurostat):
 - 1. In the HBS: Non durable consumption is regressed on selected expenditure items (food consumption at home, outside home and utilities) and on the qualitative indicators about other expenditures
 - 2. Estimated coefficients are used to impute the non durable consumption at the household level in the FWS

Results:

- Total non durable consumption measure covers 89 % of the national accounts aggregate (considering harmonized definitions)
- distributions of the imputed consumption variable in the FWS and the original variable measured in the HBS are very close

Fig. Observed (HBS) and imputed distribution (FWS) of non-durable consumption




2. Consumption, wealth and income distributions in France

	Non durable consumption	Net wealth	lı	ncome
			Total Income	Excl. Capital income
Mean (euros)	24,500	229,300	36,900	32,700
Median (euros)	22,300	114,500	29,200	26,900
P90/Median	1.99	4.42	2.20	2.16
Gini	0.33	0.65	0.38	0.36

Source: INSEE, Household Budget Survey, French

Wealth Survey

2. Data: Assets composition by gross wealth percentile



2. Data: Econometric sample

- Questions on consumption: asked only to a (randomly selected and representative) sub-sample: about 4,500 households among the 15,006 in the full sample
- Cleaning to exclude very specific behaviours : Extreme values of C/Y, W, Y
- Restricted to RP aged 25-75
- Econometric sample: 3,454 households
- Composition (demographic and wealth variables) very similar to the full sample

3. Empirical analysis

■ Baseline model: a simple consumption function, similar approach as Paiella (2007):

$$\frac{C_h}{Y_h} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \frac{W_h}{Y_h} + \gamma Z_h + u_h$$

- Ch: non durable consumption of household h
- **Y**: current income (non property income)
- W: net wealth which can be decomposed into net values of housing (main residence and other real estate), **financial and others assets** (valuables and business assets)
- Z: Controls for heterogeneity in life-cycle position, preferences, risks exposure and credit constraints: age, work status, education of the reference person, household composition, credit constraint, past unemployment episodes, sick leaves, income expectations (dummy variable, expect positive average income growth five years hence).

☐ Heterogeneous MPC across the net wealth distribution

$$\frac{C_h}{Y_h} = \beta_0 + \sum_{i=1}^J \beta_1^j \frac{W_h}{Y_h} * I_h^j + \gamma Z_h + u_h \qquad \qquad \text{j= net wealth category}$$

$$I_h^j = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if h belongs to the j NW category} \\ 0 & \text{Otherwise} \end{cases}$$

☐ Macroeconomic implications

Consumption elasticities of a given NW group j

$$\varepsilon_{c/w}^{j} = \beta_1^{j} \frac{W^{j}}{\overline{C^{j}}}$$

3. Baseline results

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff. Std. Er	<u>r.</u>
Wealth						
Gross wealth	0.005*	** 0.001	-	-		
Net wealth	-	-	0.006*	*** 0.001		
Financial wealth	-	-	-	-	0.002 *** 0.001	
Main residence	-	-	-	-	0.007*** 0.001	
Other real estate	-	-	-	-	0.007*** 0.001	
Other assets	-	-	-	-	0.007*** 0.001	
Positive income expectations	0.002*	* 0.001	0.002*	·* 0.001	0.002** 0.001	

OLS estimates- Econometric sample

Control variables: age, work status, education of the reference person, household composition, credit constraint, past unemployment episodes, sick leaves

4. Heterogeneity across the wealth distribution

Specification		Regressi	Regression results			Computation of elasticities			
		((1)		(2)	(3)	(4)=(1)*(2)/(3)		
		Marginal p consum	_	=	w	c	Consumption elasticity to wealth		
	Wealth percentil dummy	le		Std. Err.	(mean - euros)	(mean-euros)			
	Financial assets				<u> </u>				
	p1-p49	0.122	***	0.014	8,000	22,000	0.044		
	p50-p69	0.020	***	0.008	26,400	23,700	0.022		
	p70-p89	0.013	**	0.006	52,800	28,200	0.024		
	p90-p99	0.002		0.001	178,100	35,800	0.009		
	Housing wealth								
	p1-p49	0.014	**	0.006	14,650	22,000	0.009		
(B)	p50-p69	0.009	***	0.002	139,700	23,700	0.051		
	p70-p89	0.008	***	0.002	269,800	28,200	0.080		
	p90-p99	0.008	***	0.001	519,300	35,800	0.116		
	Other assets								
	p1-p49	0.025	**	0.008	1,300	22,000	0.002		
	p50-p69	0.035	***	0.008	14,000	23,700	0.020		
	p70-p89	0.014	***	0.003	29,000	28,200	0.015		
	p90-p99	0.006	***	0.001	261,800	35,800	0.044		
	Control variables	yes							
	R ²	0.175							

4. Additional results and robustness

- ☐ Disaggregating housing wealth into "main residence" and "other real estate" (secondary residences and housing assets held for investment purposes)
- MPC's decreasing pattern for both housing components
- For a given net wealth group, the MPC out of other real estate is significantly higher than the MPC out of the value of the main residence (except in the p90-p99 wealth group where there are no significant difference between the two types of housing assets).

Specification			Regressi	on res	sults	Comp	utation of elast	
			(1)			(2)	(3)	(4)=(1)*(2)/(3)
			Marginal p	roper	=	W		Consumption elasticity to wealth
		Wealth				lmaan		
		percentile dummy	Coefficient		Std. Err.	(mean - euros)	(mean-euros)	
	Financial asse	-	Cocinciciii		Jta. Lii.	Carosy	(mean earos)	
		p1-p49	0.122	**	0.014	8,000	22,000	0.044
		p50-p69	0.020	***	0.008	26,400	23,700	
		p70-p89	0.013	***	0.006	52,800	28,200	0.024
		p90-p99	0.002		0.001	178,100	35,800	0.009
	Main residen	ce						
		p1-p49	0.012	***	0.006	14,650	22,000	0.008
		p50-p69	0.007	***	0.003	128,500	23,700	0.039
		p70-p89	0.009	***	0.002	233,200	28,200	0.073
		p90-p99	0.008	***	0.002	332,000	35,800	0.077
(C)	Other real es	tate						
		p1-p49	0.030	**	0.015	700	22,000	0.001
		p50-p69	0.023	***	0.008	16,400	23,700	0.016
		p70-p89	0.006	***	0.004	41,600	28,200	0.008
		p90-p99	0.008	***	0.001	233,600	35,800	0.051
	Other assets	p1-p49	0.026	***	0.008	1,300	22,000	0.002
		p50-p69	0.035	***	0.008	14,000	23,700	0.021
		p70-p89	0.014	***	0.003	29,000	28,200	0.015
		p90-p99	0.006	***	0.001	261,800	35,800	0.044
	Control varial	bles	yes					
	R ²		0.184					

4. Additional results and robustness

□ Endogeneity issues: spurious correlation between consumption and wealth, due to missing variable correlated with C and W

1) Expectations about income and future activity

- Already control for income expectations
- We add control variables for the heterogeneity in local housing prices (geographical control for the location of the HMR), see Cooper, 2013 or Bover, 2005.

Our results are not dramatically impacted.

2) Asset-holding decisions : Some factors not observed or not fully captured by the control variables (such as taste, time and risk preferences) might be expected to affect both consumption and asset allocations.

Estimation restricted to households holding similar types of assets: homeowners and stockholders. These estimates confirm the decreasing MPC pattern.

□ Considering 5 net wealth groups instead of 4 This does not affect our main conclusions.

4. The role of indebtedness

- ☐ Collateral channel: higher housing wealth may relax financial constraints when loans are guarantied by housing assets (mortgages).
- □ Credit markets: French institutional features
- 1) Specificities of the mortgage market: very limited use for other purpose than real estate acquisition
 - Using mortgages to finance other assets than the collateralized one was only permitted by law during a limited period of time (2007-2014)
 - value of the collateral is not re-evaluated over time + credit revolving cannot be guarantied by housing property
- 2) Two types of loans to purchase a property:
- housing loan insured by an insurance scheme (70%)
- Mortgage collateralized by housing assets (30%)

Wealth variables	Wealth percentile	With loans guarantied by real estate collateral		Without I	Column 1 econometric sample		
			<u>-</u>	All		Indebted households with a real estate property	restricted to households with at least
		(1)		(2)		(3)	one mortgage
		Coeff.		Coeff.		Coeff.	5c
		Std. Err.	_	Std. Err.	_	Std. Err.	Column 2:
Financial Wealth	h p1-p49	0.045 <i>0.079</i>		0.117 <i>0.015</i>	***	0.204 *** 0.047	other households
	p50-p69	0.060 <i>0.036</i>	*	0.021 <i>0.008</i>	***	0.018 0.026	without mortgages
	p70-p89	0.042 <i>0.019</i>	**	0.013 <i>0.006</i>	**	0.028 ** 0.011	Column 3: sub-
	p90-p99	0.005 <i>0.004</i>		0.001 <i>0.001</i>		0.004 ** 0.002	population of column 2:
Housing wealth			-		•		households
	p1-p49	0.078 <i>0.019</i>	***	0.012 <i>0.006</i>	*	0.048 *** 0.011	without mortgages that
	p50-p69		***	0.010 0.003	***	0.032 *** 0.005	are nonetheless in
	p70-p89		***	0.008 0.002	***	0.021 *** 0.003	debt and have at least one
	p90-p99		***	0.008 0.001	***	0.011 *** 0.001	real estate
Other wealth	<u> </u>	0.008	***	0.007	***	0.009 ***	property.
		0.002		0.001		0.001	
Control variables	5	yes	-	yes	•	yes	
R²		0.227		0.178		0.247	
#observations		437		3,017		1,166	

4. Collateral channel and indebtedness

□ Everything else being equal, the consumption of households with mortgages is more sensitive to the value of the housing wealth.
 □ Given the institutional features in France: unlikely to reflect a collateral channel
 □ Possible explanation: a selection effect in the bank lending supply?
 i.e. banks only offer mortgages to highly specific households.
 Significant differences between the average characteristics of indebted households depending on the type of loan they have.

"mortgage households": higher income, housing wealth and total debt, more often self-employed and younger than the other indebted households.

Differences in unobservable characteristics? (more concerned with the value of their housing assets, more accurate evaluation of their wealth, etc...)

Means characteristics Indebted households holding one property or more

	With at least one mortgage	With other loans (and no mortgage)
	(mean values)	(mean values)
Wealth and income		
Gross wealth	460,600	429,200
Net wealth	346,700	350,200
Financial assets	52,200	61,600
Main residence	229,600	212,700 **
Other real estate	84,800	61,800 **
Other assets	93,900	87,100
Income (excluding income		
from housing and financial		
assets)	46,000	44,200 **
Total debt	121,200	71,500 **
Debt Service	12,000	7,700 **
Asset holding (% of HH)		
household's main residence	0.950	0.924 **
Other real estate	0.316	0.322
Business	0.283	0.236**

Means characteristics Indebted households holding one property or more

With at least one mortgage (mean values)		With other loans (and no mortgage) (mean values)		
Age				
25 to 29	0.049	0.046		
30 to 39	0.289	0.213**		
40 to 49	0.351	0.253**		
50 to 59	0.211	0.257**		
60 to 69	0.083	0.179**		
70 to 75	0.011	0.044**		
More than 75	0.006	0.008		
Employment status				
Self-employed	0.141	0.108**		
Employee	0.735	0.635**		
Retired	0.087	0.224**		
Jnemployed	0.022	0.019		
Others	0.015	0.014		
Education				
No qualification	0.107	0.094		
Primary or Secondary	0.377	0.436**		
Baccalaureat	0.161	0.145		
Post-secondary	0.174	0.137**		
Tertiary	0.181	0.188		
# observations	1,681	4,200		

Conclusion

☐ Limited housing and financial wealth effects on consumption in France

☐ Decreasing MPC across the wealth distribution

Financial assets: From 12.2 cents to non significant MPC in the top of the NW distribution

Housing assets: from 1.4 cents to 0.8 cent

☐ Is financial or housing wealth the main channel?

Our answer: it depends on the households' position in the NW distribution

Conclusion

- ☐ Higher MPC out of housing wealth for households having mortgages: selection effect of the bank lending supply?
- ☐ Future research: HFCS to study cross-country heterogeneity on these issues

ANNEXES

CONSUMPTION QUESTIONS IN THE FRENCH WEALTH SURVEY

- [Q1.] Over the last 12 months, how much have you spend, on average per month, for food at home (excluding food consume in restaurants), considering every member of your household?
- [Q2.] And how much do you spend, for your household as a whole, for food taken outside (including school or at-work restaurant, fast-food, meal and sandwiches eat in the workplace) ?
- [Q3.] Over the last 12 months, how much have you spend, for water, electicity and gas, heating and communication bills (telephone and web connexion)?
- [Q4-Q11.] Over the last 12 months has any member of your household had regular expenses regarding:
- •public transport (train, bus, plane, subway and taxi)
- •other transport with motorized vehicle or bicycle (gas expenses, insurance, etc. but not the vehicle acquisition expenses themselves)
- •on cultural and recreational goods or services (books, movies, music, concert,
- other form of recreational goods or services
- •health (expenses not covered by public or employer insurance scheme)
- •children education or childcare

museum and art exhibitions, etc.)

•clothing

- •personal services (housekeeping, gardenkeeping, other)
- [Q12.] How much do you spend, on an average month, for your usual consumption only (food, clothes, heating, transports, leisure, various services,...), excluding rents, repayments, large expenditure on durables (e.g. buying a car, a refrigerator, a washing-machine, furnitures,...) ?

The reference person's expectations concerning future household income are elicited using the following question, put in questionnaire module (for another sub sample than the "consumption one)

How do you imagine your household's total income will change over the next five years? You have 100 percentage points to allocate among the 7 choices below: Your household's total income will: increase by [more than 25%, 10% to 25%, less than 10%] be the same as today, decrease by [less than 10%, 10% to 25%, more than 25%]

We compute the mean expected changes for each respondent considering the mean value for each bracket and the percentage points given for each choice. We define "optimistic households" as those where the respondent expects a positive mean change in total income in the next five years.

- we estimate the linear probability of a household expecting a positive change in household income in the next five years
- Explanatory variables: detailed household composition, the reference person's demographic variables (age, age squared, detailed social status, education) and information on the reference person's parents (father's main occupation during the reference person's childhood).
- In sample imputation

Table B1. Indicators of income expectations: quality of fit

		Average expected changes in income (%)	% of "optimistic" households
Subsample "expectations and preferences"	Observed	3.25	56.3
	Estimated	3.13	56.5
Econometric subsample	Predicted	1.56	52.2

Wealth variables	Wealth percentile	Homeowners	Stockholders
		<u>(1)</u>	(2)
		Coeff.	Coeff.
		Std. Err.	Std. Err.
Financial Wealth			
	p1-p49	0.086***	0.170***
		0.030	0.032
	p50-p69	0.023*	0.018
		0.012	0.015
	p70-p89	0.023 ***	0.023 ***
		0.006	0.009
	p90-p99	0.004 ***	0.004 * * *
		0.001	0.002
Housing wealth			
	p1-p49	0.062***	0.055*
		0.007	0.034
	p50-p69	0.031***	0.032***
		0.003	0.009
	p70-p89	0.019***	0.020***
		0.002	0.004
	p90-p99	0.012***	0.012 ***
		0.001	0.001
Other wealth			
	p1-p49	0.013*	0.023
		0.008	0.055
	p50-p69	0.030***	0.032
		0.010	0.039
	p70-p89	0.013 ***	0.031***
		0.003	0.009
	p90-p99	0.007***	0.008***
		0.001	0.002
Control variables		yes	yes
R ²		0.266	0.302
#observations		2,364	837

The role of indebtedness

☐ Debt pressure:

- The debt-to-assets ratio: household "under pressure" when this ratio is above 2;
- The debt-service-to-income ratio: "highly indebted" when above 25% (which corresponds to the 9th decile of these ratios in the population).

		Debt to asset	ratio	Debt service t	o income ratio
Wealth variables	Wealth percentile	ratio>2 Coeff. Std. Err.	ratio<2 Coeff. Std. Err.	ratio >0,25 Coeff. Std. Err.	ratio <0,25 Coeff. Std. Err.
Financial Wealth					
	p1-p49	0.017	0.117***	0.041	0.124**
		0.044	0.015	0.062	0.015
	p50-p69	0.068**	0.021 ***	0.030	0.021***
		0.034	0.008	0.041	0.008
	p70-p89	0.042***	0.013 **	0.054 **	0.013***
		0.016	0.006	0.022	0.006
	p90-p99	0.002	0.001	0.004	0.000
		0.003	0.001	0.002	0.001
Housing wealth					
	p1-p49	0.032**	0.016 * *	0.041 ***	* 0.013 ***
		0.016	0.007	0.016	0.007
	p50-p69	0.030***	0.009 ***	0.019 **	0.010***
		0.007	0.003	0.007	0.003
	p70-p89	0.018***	0.008 ***	0.010 **	0.009***
		0.005	0.002	0.004	0.002
	p90-p99	0.013***	0.007 ***	0.007 ***	* 0.009***
		0.002	0.001	0.002	0.001
Other wealth		0.006***	0.007	0.006 ***	* 0.008***
		0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001
Control variables		yes	yes	yes	yes
R ²		0.258	0.177	0.227	0.184
#observations		550	2904	527	2927